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Non-technical summary 
How long workers stay in their jobs is of central importance for individuals’ work histories, 
employers’ personnel policies and the functioning of the labor market.  Within and across 
industries, companies, institutional regimes and groups of workers, employment spells differ vastly 
in duration.  Using German linked employer-employee-data we analyse job durations from both 
sides of the employment relationship. We address two main questions. First, what is the relative 
importance of worker characteristics, firm-level variables and institutions for job duration, and how 
are they related to each other? Is there evidence for segmentation within companies, such that a core 
workforce is protected against job losses by the employment of a marginal workforce with short 
tenure on average, or do observed differences in tenure mainly stem from different tenure levels at 
different firms? A second question is whether effects differ between different exit states namely 
between job-to-job and job-to-unemployment changes. 
Kaplan–Meier survivor functions show that more than fifty percent of all new employment 
relationships end after in the first two years. The estimation results indicate huge differences 
between individuals but also between establishments with different characteristics. We conclude 
that persistence in individual mobility behavior is much reduced when firm-level heterogeneity is 
accounted for. Blue collar workers tend to select into long-tenure firms as compared to white collar 
workers. Positive effects of works councils and further training on job duration are high for blue 
collar skilled or semi-skilled workers but non-existent for white collar employees. Competing risks 
analysis shows that mobility to another job and exit to unemployment follow strikingly different 
processes. For instance having a university degree lowers the unemployment hazard but increases 
the likelihood of a job-to-job change. 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Betriebszugehörigkeit ist eine wichtige Größe im Hinblick auf die persönliche Erwerbshistorie, 
personalpolitische Maßnahmen eines Arbeitgebers und den Arbeitsmarkt insgesamt. Innerhalb und 
zwischen Sektoren, Unternehmen, verschiedenen Institutionen und bestimmten 
Beschäftigungsgruppen gibt es große Unterschiede in der durchschnittlichen Betriebszugehörigkeit. 
Mit verknüpften Beschäftigten- und Betriebsdaten analysieren wir den Einfluss beider Seiten eines 
Beschäftigungsverhältnisses auf Beschäftigungsdauern. Zwei Fragen stehen im Mittelpunkt der 
Analysen. Erstens, wie groß ist der Einfluss von individuellen Charakteristika, 
Betriebsinformationen und Institutionen auf die Betriebszugehörigkeit und wie stehen diese im 
Verhältnis zueinander? Gibt es Segmentierungsprozesse, so dass in einem Betrieb eine bestimmte 
Gruppe von Beschäftigten gegen Jobverluste abgesichert ist, weil eine andere Gruppe mit 
durchschnittlich kurzen Beschäftigungsdauern Schwankungen in der Gesamtbeschäftigung 
auffängt? Oder kommen unterschiedliche Beschäftigungsdauern hauptsächlich durch die 
Heterogenität zwischen Betrieben zustande, so dass sie durch Betriebscharakteristika erklärt werden 
können? Zweitens wird die Frage beantwortet, ob die Effekte unterschiedlich sind, wenn man 
zwischen direkten Arbeitgeberwechseln und Übergängen in Arbeitslosigkeit differenziert. 
Kaplan-Meier Überlebensfunktionen zeigen, dass über fünfzig Prozent der neu begonnenen 
Beschäftigungsverhältnisse nach zwei Jahren wieder beendet sind. Mit proportionalen Cox 
Schätzungen finden wir große Unterschiede zwischen Individuen aber auch zwischen Betrieben mit 
unterschiedlichen Charakteristika. Der Einfluss individueller Charakteristika wird erheblich 
reduziert, wenn Betriebsinformationen mit berücksichtigt werden. So selektieren sich Arbeiter im 
Vergleich zu Angestellten in Betriebe mit langen Beschäftigungsdauern. Positive Effekte, die durch 
Betriebsräte und Weiterbildungsangebote generiert werden, wirken vor allem auf die Mobilität von 
Arbeitern aber kaum auf die von Angestellten. Weiterhin finden wir, dass sich die Effekte auf 
direkte Übergänge von einem zum nächsten Arbeitgeber sehr von Übergängen aus Beschäftigung in 
Arbeitslosigkeit unterscheiden. Ein Universitätsabschluss verringert zum Beispiel die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, in Arbeitslosigkeit zu wechseln, erhöht aber die direkten Arbeitgeberwechsel. 
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How long workers stay in their jobs is of central importance for individuals’ work histories, 
employers’ personnel policies and the functioning of the labor market.  Within and across 
industries, companies, institutional regimes and groups of workers, employment spells differ vastly 
in duration.  In this paper, we estimate a reduced-form model of job exit using a linked employer–
employee dataset. 
Our paper is motivated by two empirical questions.  First, what is the relative importance of 
worker characteristics, firm-level variables and institutions for job duration, and how are they 
related to each other?  Empirical evidence shows that transitions from jobs depend on individual 
attributes such as age or education, but firms also differ with respect to the employment duration of 
their workers (Battu et al., 2002; Bronars and Famulari, 1997; Dohmen and Pfann, 2003; Gerlach 
and Stephan, 2005; Mumford and Smith, 2004).  Firm-level industrial relations, such as the 
presence of shop-floor employee representation, may influence the number of quits and layoffs 
(Addison and Teixeira, 2006; Addison et al., 2001, Frick, 1996).  The impact of institutions is likely 
to differ with worker characteristics.  For instance, works councils may be dominated by blue collar 
workers, increasing job stability only for this group.  To capture these differences, we use a flexible 
parametric specification in our empirical estimations.  In addition, we analyze the existence of 
sorting processes such that workers with long expected job durations are matched to firms offering 
stable employment (and vice versa). 
 A second question is whether effects differ between exit states.  It can be easily derived from 
a job search model that the determinants of job-to-job mobility are different from those that 
influence transitions into unemployment.  For instance, the presence of a works council might, on 
the one hand, increase job satisfaction, reduce on-the-job searching and decrease the number of job-
to-job transitions. On the other hand it might increase employers’ firing costs and thereby influence 
the productivity threshold (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) below which layoffs are made.  This 
affects the dismissal rate and, if most laid-off workers experience a period of unemployment 
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following dismissal, the number of job-to-unemployment transitions.  While the direction of the 
influence is the same in both cases, the two mechanisms are distinct and the magnitude of the 
influence is likely to differ. 
 These issues are investigated on the basis of a German dataset which is more appropriate 
and contains more information than the datasets previously available.  Existing studies use stock 
data containing information which relates only to the current spell at the date of interview, but not 
to completed job durations.  This leads to selection bias because the distribution of unobservables 
differs in the stock of ongoing and in the flow of newly started jobs.  An advantage of stock data is 
that longer maximum durations are observed than in the case of flow data, making it easier to 
investigate changes of job durations over time.  In the flow data we use, however, about three-
quarters of all new employment relationships end within the observation period, while only one-
quarter of the spells are right-censored.    
With some exceptions such as Dostie (2005) and Mumford and Smith (2004), previous 
studies mostly use data with little information on the firm side, such as worker-level administrative 
or survey data.  Estimation based on this type of data yields unbiased coefficients if firm fixed 
effects are included (e.g. Bronars and Famulari, 1997).  However, the data often contain only one 
worker per firm, which means that fixed effects are not identified.  Moreover, the effect of firm-
level characteristics varying over time and their interaction with individual covariates cannot be 
ascertained in this way.   
Our results show that differences in mobility between different parts of the labor market are 
large.  Institutions such as works councils and the availability of further training play a pronounced 
role in reducing mobility within the market, and furthermore, they interact with individual 
characteristics.  Including institutions and firm characteristics in a flexible way is, therefore, 
essential for modeling job durations. 
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Theoretical background 
A theoretical framework for modeling the probability of job exit is provided by the search and 
matching approach pioneered by Burdett (1978) and Jovanovic (1979a).1  In the simplest 
formulation, an employed worker will take any job that is better paid than his current one.  The 
probability of a worker’s leaving current employment for another job within a given period is then 
one minus the cumulative distribution function of wage offers arriving in each time period, 
evaluated at the current wage.  In a framework with many periods, workers who have spent more 
time on the labor market will have received more wage offers.  They are thus more likely to have a 
high current wage and less likely to exit their current jobs.  As a consequence, time in the labor 
market or age are important explanatory variables for job mobility and current wages are 
endogenous to time spent in the labor market. 
Extending this model to allow for involuntary dismissals, these are typically taken as 
exogenous, so that the probability of being dismissed is determined by a stochastic productivity 
shock.  Moving from partial equilibrium for workers to general equilibrium, Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994) also include hiring costs.  In this case, retaining the worker may be valuable for 
the firm because it preserves the option of employing the same worker in the next period.  At a 
given wage, this yields a reservation level of productivity.  If the stochastic productivity shock falls 
below this threshold, the worker is dismissed. In this way, institutions influencing search frictions  
become important determinants of job mobility.  
The Jovanovic (1979) model assumes asymmetric information at the start of a new 
employment relationship.  Match quality is an experience good.  Its value increases with tenure 
                                              
1  These models have been extended and transformed from partial equilibrium into general equilibrium models 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).  They are used for explaining macroeconomic phenomena such as equilibrium 
unemployment, wage distributions and mobility rates.  Pissarides (1994) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) placed 
on-the-job search models into this equilibrium framework.   
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until all information is available for both employer and employee or until the match comes to an 
end.  With increasing outside options, e.g. higher wages offered by other employers or a high job 
finding rate, on-the-job search increases, leading to shorter job duration.  However, with rising job 
duration, the likelihood that an outside offer will be higher than the match-specific rents created by 
reduced uncertainty about match quality declines, affecting job duration positively.2  The empirical 
specification of the job exit probability must, therefore, allow for duration dependence.3  The basic 
regularities predicted by the partial-equilibrium search and matching framework are captured in our 
empirical specification by a reduced-form approach using hazard rate analysis.4 
  
The role of institutions for job durations 
Within the framework outlined above, institutions influence job exit through their impact on hiring 
and firing costs.  The German labor market is highly regulated by international standards.  Wages 
and working hours are fixed by collective agreements, mandatory job protection and employee 
representation are strict, and many other regulations exist (Addison et al., 2001; Gerlach and 
Stephan, 2005; Frick, 1996).  Most regulations are mandatory for all employers, although thresholds 
in terms of establishment size exist (Koller, 2005).  In the following, we focus on company-level 
institutions that vary across the establishments in our sample.   
Works councils are the main institution of shop-floor worker representation in Germany.5  
In establishments with at least five employees, workers are legally entitled to establish a works 
                                              
2  Another reason for job-specific rents is accumulation of job-specific human capital.  
3  Moscarini (2005) as well as Pries and Rogerson (2005) bring together the Jovanovic (1979) and the Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994) model.  For recent surveys see Rogerson et al.  (2005), or Yashiv (2007). 
4   Based on employer–employee data, there have also been attempts to estimate structural models (e.g. Jolivet et al., 
2006, Nagypál, 2005).  For a discussion of structural and reduced-form approaches, see Cahuc and Zylberberg 
(2004: 146). 
5  Another German institution of worker participation, the presence of employee representatives in supervisory 
boards, has no direct effect on hiring and firing practices and is, therefore, not discussed here. 
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council.  In practice, however, employees in small establishments often do not take the initiative to 
set up one.  In establishments with a works council, voluntary separations may decrease if the 
council gives employees a voice’, leading to higher job satisfaction.  At the same time, involuntary 
separations may be affected if the works council increases separation costs.  Participation rights of 
works councils are regulated in detail by the Works Constitution Act and the Dismissal Protection 
Law.  Articles 102-104 of the Works Constitution Act grant consultation rights in dismissal cases.  
Works councils can raise objections within one week from the notification of dismissal.  In 
addition, the works council can make suggestions in order to stabilize employment which must be 
answered by the employer.  According to Article 112 of the Works Constitution Act, the works 
council has a right to participate in drawing up a social plan in the case of mass redundancies.  
Collective agreements are generally negotiated at industry level between unions and 
employers’ associations and are mandatory for all employees whose employer is a member of an 
employers’ association.  In 2003, 70 per cent of West German employees and 47 per cent of East 
German employees were covered by collective agreements.  In West Germany, there has been a 
decline in the coverage rate since the late 1990s (Fitzenberger et al., 2008; Schnabel 2005).  The 
trend towards local bargaining was strengthened by the increasing use of opening clauses, allowing 
for deviations from the terms of the collective contract (Heinbach, 2007).  Although German unions 
have no legally defined participation rights with regard to dismissal protection, the Works 
Constitution Act gives unions a wide range of information rights and their influence on the election 
of works councils is high.  Very often, unions play a role in drawing up a social plan in the event of 
mass redundancies.  Furthermore, they try to avoid reductions in employment by adjustment of 
working hours or reduced wage claims in collective agreements.  Hence, one might expect higher 
job stability in establishments covered by collective agreements.  At the same time, the presence of 
collective agreements may also lead to wage rigidity.  This can lead the firm to adjust employment 
instead of wages in bad times, which decreases average job duration. 
6 
Data on Job Durations from the LIAB 
The Linked Employer–Employee Data of the IAB Institute (LIAB) combine administrative data on 
employees obtained from social insurance files with employer data from an annual representative 
survey of 16,000 establishments.  The data contain information on all workers employed in 
surveyed establishments.  We use the longitudinal version I of the LIAB, which contains daily 
employment and benefit recipient information for the period from 1991 to 2001. 
 The firm side of the LIAB consists of information taken from the IAB Establishment Panel, 
the most extensive survey among firms in Germany.  The number of establishments in the LIAB 
longitudinal data is limited to those having valid interviews from 1999 to 2001.6     
 The employee part of the LIAB is the Employment Statistics Register of the Federal 
Employment Agency.  This administrative data record is based on declarations of employers to the 
German social insurance institutions.  Depending on the circumstances, misreporting is either a 
summary or a criminal offense, and therefore the reliability of the data is high.  The data contain 
daily information on all employment relationships covered by the social security system.  Other 
forms of employment are not recorded in the data.7  Overall, the Employment Statistics Register 
covers about 80 percent of total employment.  The Register is further combined with data on 
periods of unemployment benefit receipt obtained from the Benefit Recipient Data of the Federal 
Employment Agency.  Spells of unemployment are recorded only in cases where unemployment 
benefit is received and/or there is participation in active labor market programs.  If we bear this in 
mind, the data allow us to construct complete employment biographies of those employees covered 
by the social security system.   
                                              
6  Worker separations due to plant closures cannot be observed in our data. 
7  This concerns self-employment, civil servants, marginal work remunerated below a monthly income threshold, 
unpaid family workers, and employment abroad. 
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 The LIAB longitudinal version I covers 2,100 establishments in both the Western and the 
Eastern parts of Germany, and the employment histories from 1991 to 2001 of all individuals 
employed for at least one day between 1996 and 2001 in one of the sample establishments. 
In the following, we define an employment spell as the period from the beginning until the 
end of an employment relationship within a particular establishment.8  As we define it, the end of 
an employment spell occurs if two conditions apply.  First, the individual is observed to move into 
unemployment, or non-employment, or is hired by a new employer.  Second, the current employer 
reports the end of the employment relationship to the insurance institution. The current spell is 
right-censored if either of these conditions does not hold, or if the end of the observation period is 
reached.9   
One advantage of these data is the possibility of observing into which employment state a 
worker moves after the end of a spell.  Four exit states are distinguished: unemployment, new 
employer, recall to the previous employer, and non-employment.  Periods of unemployment are 
difficult to define because the data contain only information for the time during which a person 
receives unemployment benefit from the German Federal Employment Agency.  Since not all 
unemployed workers qualify for unemployment insurance (UI), and benefits may be temporarily 
suspended in case of sanctions, individuals can be unemployed without receiving UI benefits (see 
                                              
8  In order to avoid having many short spells due to seasonal factors, we define two successive employment spells 
within the same employer (even if we observe an unemployment spell in between) as one spell if the recall takes 
place 90 days after the end of the first period at maximum.  If an observed spell is interrupted for reasons like 
parental leave, illness or sabbaticals, we also define the whole period as one employment spell (independently of 
the duration of the interruption). 
9  Employers are obligated to report the end of an employment relationship. In some cases we observe a change in the 
employment state or in the employer identifier but no reported end of the relationship.  In these cases, it is uncertain 
whether a job change actually occurred.  Hence, we define these spells as right-censored.  The exception is a move 
into unemployment because in this case, we have additional information relating to the start of benefit payments. 
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Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004).  We define unemployment as receipt of UI benefit for at least one 
day within 60 days after the end of the previous employment spell.   
 A job-to-job change is defined as a separation followed by an employment spell which 
commences within 60 days of the end of the previous one.  It is likely that in most of these cases, 
the new employment relationship was already known about when the previous job ended.  Another 
case is that the employee is recalled to the previous employer because of fluctuating demand, 
temporary illness or other reasons.  We define the exit state as a recall if we observe a return to the 
same employer at least 91 days after the end of the current spell.  The exit state is defined as non-
employment if we observe neither subsequent employment nor a spell of unemployment within 60 
days of the end of the current spell.  This state comprises different situations such as unemployment 
without benefit receipt, inactivity or self-employment. 
To determine the beginning of an employment spell, we proceed analogously, but we 
distinguish between short and long spells of previous non-employment.  The former are defined as 
gaps of less than one year in a person’s employment history.  Furthermore, we use a separate 
category for employees who are likely to be in their first job.  This category consists of individuals 
below 30 years of age who were starting their first spell in the data after 1996 but were not observed 
between 1991 and 1995.  In Table 1, the definitions of the exit and origin states are summarized. 
Table 1 here 
 
Sample definition and descriptive statistics 
We analyze employment durations of male workers only, because employment histories of females 
are often determined by interruptions for maternity leave.  With our data we cannot observe exactly 
whether a woman leaves the labor market solely because of the birth of a child.  Furthermore, it is 
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not possible to analyze determinants for employment durations of mothers, factors like availability 
of child care, partner’s income, etc. because we do not have this information.   
In order to avoid bias due to left-censoring, we restrict analysis to all employment spells 
which started in the sample establishments between 1996 and 2001.  We restrict data to persons 
aged 25 to 52 to exclude individuals in vocational training or in work during university vacations, 
and to avoid confusion between job exit and early retirement.  In addition, we exclude spells of 
employment that include episodes of part-time work (below 15 hours per week), vocational training 
or home working.  All spells with missing covariate information are eliminated.  These 
requirements leave us with a sample of 249,313 employment spells, of which 88,202 are from East 
Germany.10 
Table 2 here 
Kaplan–Meier survivor functions shown in graph form in panel (a) of Figure 1 give a first 
descriptive impression of job durations in the sample.11 There are striking differences between East 
and West Germany, underlining the importance of separate analyses.  Exit occurs more slowly in 
the Western part of Germany.  In the East, there is a huge drop in the survivor function after exactly 
one year.  This is probably due to the higher incidence of temporary employment in the East, 
especially in the job creation schemes used widely during the observation period.12   
Figure 1 here 
                                              
10  The number of spells according to the different exit states is reported in Table 2.  Summary statistics of all 
covariates are made accessible by the authors on request. 
11  Kaplan–Meier functions have the advantage that censored spells are taken into account in the risk group as long as 
they are observed.  The cross-sectional weights of the IAB Establishment Panel are used for estimation.  
12  On average over the period from 1995 to 2002, the share of temporary employment in the stock of employees was 
11.5 percent in East Germany, as compared to 7.0 percent in West Germany.  33.6 percent of temporary jobs were 
10 
Separate analyses according to firm characteristics show that in West Germany, survival 
rates are higher for larger establishments (panel b).  However, the ordering is less clear in East 
Germany.  In line with the findings of Gerlach and Stephan (2005), workers in firms with collective 
agreements at firm or industry level have longer job durations in West Germany (panel c).  In East 
Germany, the difference is between firms adhering or not adhering to an industry wage agreement.  
Most strikingly, median durations are two to three times longer if the establishment has a works 
council (panel d).  As the effects of firm size, bargaining regime and employee representation are all 
likely to be correlated, these estimates must be interpreted with care.  The graphs show, however, 
that mobility rates differ vastly between different parts of the German labor market.   
 
Estimation technique and independent variables 
The dependent variable in the following is the conditional hazard rate, which is defined as the 
instantaneous probability of exit from the current job: 1
0
( ) lim [ | ]
t
t t P t T t t T t−Δ →λ = Δ ≤ < + Δ ≥ , where t 
indicates time and T is the actual job duration.  If job-to-job and job-to-unemployment exits follow 
the same processes, a single exit state model is appropriate.  For individual i (i=1,…, nj) employed 
in firm j (j=1,…,m) at time t, the hazard rate is specified as 0( ) ( ) exp[ ( ) ' ]λ = λ θij ijt t z t , with ( )ijz t  
denoting a vector of individual- or firm-specific characteristics that may vary over time as well as a 
regression constant.  The model is called a proportional hazard model because the baseline hazard 
0 ( )λ t  is assumed to be shifted proportionately by the covariates (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002: 
95ff.).  A competing risks framework is used if unemployment and a new job are treated as distinct 
destination states (denoted by k in the following).  In this case, the hazard function is specific for 
each destination state, such that 0( ) ( ) exp[ ( ) ' ]λ = λ θk k kij ijt t z t  and separate parameter vectors are 
                                                                                                                                                      
subsidised by job creation schemes, as opposed to 4.3 percent in West Germany (Boockmann and Hagen, 2005: 
156).  Job creation schemes normally last for one year. 
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estimated for each state (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002: 251ff.).  To estimate the model, we use the 
semi-parametric Cox partial likelihood estimator (Cox, 1972; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002: 99ff.).   
Using a wide range of person-, match- and firm-specific covariates as well as information on 
outside options, we include a great deal of information on the determinants of job durations.  
Because of the flow sample format and the information on exit states our data is predestined for 
survival analysis methods.  These methods do not allow extensions like simultaneous estimations 
such as those in Altonji and Williams, 2005, or Topel and Ward, 1992.  We therefore model job exit 
by a reduced-form hazard rate model that is not conditional on individual wages. 
 We estimate both a model with individual characteristics only and a model with individual 
and firm characteristics.  The Employment Statistics Register contains demographic information 
(age, level of education, nationality) and job-level information (job position and occupation).  
Regarding previous employment states, we do not condition on the entire employment history but 
use only the immediately previous state.  The coefficients on lagged employment states must be 
interpreted with care because they are likely to be correlated with unobserved worker 
characteristics.  Since we cannot control for person-level fixed effects (see below), the estimated 
coefficients will represent both heterogeneity and lagged state dependence. 
 On the firm side, we include information on firm size, collective bargaining arrangements, 
works councils, age of establishment, legal status, availability of further training, investment in 
information and communication technology (ICT) and industry affiliation.  We also include year 
dummies and regional information such as dummies for Länder (federal states) and the local 
unemployment rate.  
Despite the wealth of data at our disposal, there may remain unobserved heterogeneity at the 
level of the establishment or employee correlated with the independent variables.  We account for 
firm-level unobserved heterogeneity by stratifying the sample in some of the estimations 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002: 118f.; Ridder and Tunali, 1999).  This means that a separate 
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baseline hazard is assumed for each establishment, while the coefficients of the covariates are 
assumed to be the same.  This is similar to the within-groups estimator in linear regression.  In the 
stratified case, the coefficients of time-varying firm-specific variables are identified while those of 
time-constant variables are not identified.  Including fixed effects at the person level is not feasible, 
because this would require multiple spells per person in the establishments included in our sample.  
However, only a tiny fraction of individuals has more than one spell in more than one establishment 
in the sample. 
 
Coefficient estimates for individual and job-specific characteristics 
Table 3 contains the results of Cox estimations for East and West German workers.  In both cases, 
the first column is taken from estimation with individual-specific variables only, while the second 
and third columns add firm characteristics and firm fixed effects.  Comparing the results from 
specifications with and without firm characteristics or fixed effects, the importance of self-selection 
of workers into certain firms can be assessed (Mumford and Smith, 2004).  In order to facilitate the 
quantitative interpretation of the effects, the table displays hazard ratios.13  Because our focus is on 
firm-specific effects and their interactions with worker characteristics as well as on the distinction 
between different exit states we do not discuss at length the results for individual and job-specific 
covariates. 
Table 3 here 
                                              
13   Hazard ratios are obtained by exponentiating the coefficients and indicate the ratio of the hazard for a one-unit 
change in the corresponding covariate (also see Cleves et al., 2002).  A hazard ratio of 0.8 means that the hazard 
rate drops by 20 per cent if the covariate increases by one unit. 
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Results for age, represented by dummy variables for five age intervals, are highly 
significant.  They point to the empirical validity of the Burdett (1978) model.14  The effect is, 
however, not found for East German workers.  According to human capital theory, highly educated 
workers have more general human capital and are, therefore, more mobile.  At the same time, they 
are also better able to acquire firm-specific human capital, delaying job changes.  Segmentation 
theory predicts a selection of low-skilled workers into unstable jobs.  The findings of previous 
empirical studies are mixed (Battu et al., 2002; Dostie, 2005; Holzer and Lalonde, 2000; Dustmann 
and Meghir, 2005; Mumford and Smith, 2004; Naticchioni and Panigo, 2004).  In our estimations, 
workers without vocational training or university education, but also unskilled blue collar and part-
time workers, are among the most mobile groups.  The effect of university education vanishes when 
fixed effects are included, which points to a sorting process of these workers into firms with high 
job stability.   
 Our results show that individual employment history is an important determinant of job 
duration (see also Booth et al., 1999; Battu et al., 2002).  Individuals entering employment from 
previous unemployment or non-employment face a significantly higher risk of exit as compared to 
the reference group of job changers.  However, when we account for firm heterogeneity coefficients 
are reduced dramatically, indicating that these worker groups select into low-duration firms.  As an 
indicator for local labor market conditions, we use the unemployment rate of the Land (federal 
state) concerned.  It is lagged by one year because the unemployment rate may be endogenous to 
job exit.15  Results show that the effect of local labor market conditions is weak.    
 
                                              
14  They are also in line with the ‘job shopping’ theory (Johnson, 1978; Viscusi, 1980) based on slightly different 
assumptions.  
15   We eliminate a time trend from the regional unemployment series. 
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Coefficient estimates for firm and institutional characteristics  
Coefficients for firm-level variables appear in the lower part of Table 3.  Time-invariant firm 
characteristics are not included in stratified estimation because their coefficients are not identified.  
Among the time-varying covariates, we use a dummy indicating investment into information and 
communication technology (ICT) in the previous year.  On the one hand, investment into ICT often 
requires specific training and, hence, should increase job durations.  On the other hand, it may lead 
to higher turnover rates if employees are not able (or not willing) to apply new technologies and 
new hirings are made to replace them.  As our estimates show, investment into ICT consistently 
reduces job exit rates. 
The effect of training can be checked more directly by including a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm does in fact offer further training to its employees.  If firms invest into 
their employees’ specific human capital, they have an interest in reducing quits.  According to our 
results, there is the expected negative effect of training on job exit for West German workers.  
However, it becomes marginally insignificant in stratified estimation.  In the East, the negative 
effect is actually reversed in the stratified estimation results.   
As expected, our results show that the presence of a works council leads to significantly 
longer employment durations, a finding that is consistent with the wider literature on works 
councils (see, for instance, the survey by Addison et al., 2004).    
We distinguish between industry- and firm-specific collective agreements while the base 
groups are establishments not bound by collective agreements.  We further include a dummy 
variable indicating whether the establishment pays higher wages than required by a collective 
agreement.  The results are mixed.  For East Germany, there is some evidence that collective 
bargaining stabilizes employment, while in the West we find the reverse effect for firm-level 
bargaining.  As expected, wages above the bargained level lower the exit rate.  This, however, could 
also be due to the omission of wages at the individual level from the specification.   
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 We expect tenure to be higher in larger establishments which can use internal labor markets 
to adjust employment.  In line with the results of Mumford and Smith (2004), this expectation is not 
borne out by the data: the relation fails to be monotonic, and the coefficients of the firm size group 
dummies are mostly insignificant (coefficients omitted from the printed output but available on 
request).  Younger establishments show longer job durations in East Germany while the effect is 
insignificant for the Western part.  To interpret this finding, it must be recalled that job exits from 
companies that have closed are not contained in the data.  Hence, estimation is based only on 
successful company starts. 
 
The effects of firm characteristics for different groups of workers 
The effects of firm-level variables may differ according to types of workers.  Matched employer–
employee data allow us to estimate interaction effects between firm and worker characteristics.  
Two important explanatory variables for which this is relevant are the presence of a works councils 
and the provision of further training by the enterprise.  Table 4 lists hazard ratios similar to those in 
Table 2, but split according to worker groups. 
Table 4 here 
Theoretically, the effects of further training depend on the education level of the workforce.  
If education and training are complementary, further training increases productivity and rents. 
Hence, persistence in the job should be higher for skilled workers.  Alternatively, it may be that 
providing specific skills by further training is more productive for workers with vocational training, 
and less productive for university graduates whose skills are more general.  Our empirical results 
support the latter hypothesis: further training decreases exit rates significantly only among workers 
with vocational training (the effect is, however, imprecisely estimated for East German workers).   
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A second interaction is that between works council and job position.  If a works council 
mainly represents the interests of the majority of workers, which in most cases means blue collar 
workers, this group will benefit most from the council’s ‘voice’ function.  Moreover, a works 
council may pay more attention to dismissals and other separations of blue collar workers.  The 
results are supportive of this view.  A significantly negative effect of works councils on job exit can 
only be found for blue collar workers, while white collar workers are not affected.  For part-time 
workers, the sign of the effect is actually reversed, suggesting that works councils increase labor 
market segmentation.  However, the effect is significant only for East Germany.  All interaction 
effects are highly significant, as the likelihood ratio tests in the first two rows of Table 5 show.   
Table 5 here 
Competing Risks 
So far, we have assumed that the mechanism driving job exit is the same across all exit states.  
However, it is quite plausible that the independent variables influence exit into different exit states 
in different ways.  Using the definitions from table 1, we distinguish between four exit states: 
unemployment, changing to another employer, recalls, and non-employment.  We display results for 
the first two exit states only, because the number of observations is very low with respect to the 
‘recalls’ state.  Furthermore, the coefficients of the hazard into non-employment are hard to 
interpret because we do not know exactly what situation the worker moves into.  The specification 
includes worker- and firm-level independent variables but does not consider interaction and firm 
fixed effects.  The list of independent variables is thus the same as in the middle columns of Table 
3.  Likelihood-ratio tests of the null hypothesis of a single exit state versus the competing risks 
model clearly reject a single exit state, as shown in the lower half of Table 5. 
Results in Table 6 show that the impact of most variables differs between exit states.  For 
instance, age has little influence on the probability of exit to unemployment; if anything, it increases 
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the hazard.  Consistent with the ‘job shopping’ argument, however, the probability of a job-to-job 
change declines significantly with age.  Having a university degree lowers the unemployment 
hazard but increases the likelihood of a job-to-job change.  Better job positions also protect against 
the risk of unemployment.  Previous unemployment increases the likelihood of becoming 
unemployed again, but has a negative or no effect on job-to-job changes.  In general, there is little 
consistent evidence that lagged employment states influence the probability of changing to another 
employer.  Hence, past job changes do not lead to future employment mobility, nor does ‘job 
shopping’ result in more stable employment relationships further on in the individual’s career. 
Table 6 here 
While collective bargaining arrangements are insignificant for both exit states, works 
councils reduce the transitions both to unemployment and to new jobs.  Hence, there is empirical 
support for both effects: the increase in employment protection and the ‘voice’ function.  Similarly, 
ICT investment and further training reduce both hazards, although the results are not as strong in 
the case of East Germany.  The effects of firm size are mostly insignificant (not included).  The 
regional unemployment rate reduces the job-to-job hazard in West Germany, most likely through a 
lower arrival rate of new job offers.   
 
Conclusions 
The use of linked employer–employee data strikingly increases the scope for analyzing labor 
market mobility and provides new knowledge concerning individual and firm-level determinants of 
employment durations.  In this paper, we have addressed the sorting of employees into firms with 
long or short job tenure, differences between types of workers in determining the impact of firm-
level characteristics, and the distinction between exit states such as new employment or 
unemployment.  The data used have the advantage that they are representative of a large proportion 
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of German firms and their workers, can be arranged as a representative sample of the inflows into 
employment, and have detailed information on a large number of firm-specific variables.   
Substantively, our results offer a number of conclusions that have previously been 
unavailable.  First, the differences in mobility between different parts of the labor market are large.  
While some explanatory variables often used, such as firm size, do not account for the differences, 
institutions such as works councils and the availability of further training play a pronounced role in 
reducing mobility on the labor market.   
Second, the positive effects of works councils and further training on job durations are high 
for blue collar skilled or semi-skilled workers but non-existent for white collar employees.  The 
results imply that the activities of works councils are targeted to their traditional constituencies.   
Third, persistence in individual mobility behavior is much reduced when firm-level 
heterogeneity is accounted for.  For instance, the effect of lagged unemployment is much reduced in 
a specification with firm fixed effects.  Other selection effects concern blue collar workers, who 
tend to select into long-tenure firms as compared to white collar workers. 
Fourth, competing risks analysis shows that mobility to another job and exit to 
unemployment follow strikingly different processes.  Among the findings for the firm-level 
variables, a works council slows down exit to both destinations.  This suggests that works councils 
not only increase employment protection, but also reduce quits, e.g. by lobbying employers to 
provide better working conditions.  It would be interesting to study the implications of these effects 
for long-term outcomes, such as profitability or firm entries and exits.  By highlighting employer 
characteristics as a determinant of mobility, our study not only relates to the literature on individual 
labor market mobility but may also offer insights for the analysis of labor market institutions.  
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Table 1: Definitions of Exit and Origin States 
Employment state Definition 
a) Exit states 
Unemployment Worker receives unemployment benefits for at least one day within 60 days 
after separation, is not employed with current employer for at least 90 days 
after separation 
Non-employment 
 
Worker is not employed with current employer for the next 90 days after 
separation, receives no unemployment benefits and does not change from job-
to-job for at least 60 days after separation and has recorded end of relationship 
Job-to-job change Worker takes up employment with another employer within 60 days after 
separation and has recorded end of relationship 
Recall Worker takes up employment with the same employer after more than 90 days 
after separation and has recorded end of relationship 
b) Previous employment states 
Unemployment Worker received unemployment benefits for at least one day during 60 days 
before hiring, was not employed with current employer for at least 90 days 
before hiring 
Non-employment ≤ 
1 year 
 
Worker was not employed with current employer for at least 90 days before 
hiring, received no unemployment benefits for at least 60 days before hiring, 
did not change from job-to-job for at least 60 days before hiring, was observed 
in the year before hiring 
Non-employment > 
1 year 
Worker was not observed for at least 1 year before hiring 
Recall 
 
Worker was employed with current employer for more than 90 days before 
hiring, previous spell ended with recorded end of relationship, worker 
received no unemployment benefits during 60 days before hiring, did not 
change from job-to-job during 60 days before employment 
Job-to-job change  Worker changed from job-to-job at most 60 days before employment 
First employment Worker not observed since January 1st, 1991, not older than 30 years at the 
first observed spell between 1996 and 2001  
 
Table 2: Number of spells in the sample 
 West East 
 # spells # spells 
Number of employment spells 161,111 88,202 
Exit state  
Unemployment (share) 20,810 (13) 33,649 (38) 
Non-employment (share) 16,900 (10) 7,934 (9) 
New employer (share) 30,246 (19) 12,344 (14) 
Recall (share) 1,923 (1) 641 (1) 
Censored spells (share) 91,232 (57) 33,634 (38) 
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Table 3: Results from Cox Estimation of Job Duration 
 West Germany East Germany 
 Individual-specific variables 
Individual and firm-
specific variables 
Stratified  
estimation 
Individual-specific 
variables 
Individual and firm-
specific variables Stratified  estimation 
Independent Variables hazard  ratio t-Stat. 
hazard  
ratio t-Stat. 
hazard  
ratio t-Stat. 
hazard  
ratio t-Stat. 
hazard  
ratio t-Stat. 
hazard  
ratio t-Stat. 
Age in years (reference group: 25-29)       
Age 30-34 0.900 (-2.63) 0.898 (-2.55) 0.871 (-3.89) 0.970 (-0.60) 0.976 (-0.47) 0.929 (-1.71) 
Age 35-39 0.861 (-3.60) 0.866 (-3.30) 0.855 (-4.12) 0.985 (-0.31) 1.018 (0.35) 0.917 (-1.91) 
Age 40-44 0.866 (-3.08) 0.861 (-3.11) 0.795 (-5.36) 0.959 (-0.90) 0.990 (-0.20) 0.922 (-1.91) 
Age 45-52 0.696 (-7.29) 0.698 (-6.61) 0.705 (-7.75) 0.944 (-1.35) 0.984 (-0.37) 0.915 (-2.20) 
Education (reference group: vocational training)       
Secondary school 1.095 (2.16) 1.054 (1.17) 1.105 (2.40) 1.063 (1.21) 1.038 (0.74) 1.171 (4.07) 
A-Level 1.729 (7.38) 1.923 (7.26) 1.942 (8.75) 2.075 (5.75) 2.023 (6.06) 1.768 (5.07) 
Voc. Training/A-
Level 
0.976 (-0.35) 1.065 (0.83) 1.100 (1.58) 1.283 (2.46) 1.280 (2.46) 1.163 (1.74) 
University 0.776 (-5.08) 0.897 (-2.00) 0.998 (-0.04) 1.008 (0.15) 1.025 (0.42) 1.088 (1.42) 
Job position (reference group: unskilled blue collar)        
Skilled blue collar 0.929 (-1.78) 0.846 (-3.86) 0.742 (-6.62) 0.764 (-7.85) 0.790 (-6.05) 0.791 (-5.29) 
White collar 0.645 (-8.43) 0.690 (-6.52) 0.734 (-5.37) 0.469 (14.59) 0.537 (10.99) 0.705 (-5.76) 
Master craftsman 0.735 (-2.71) 0.678 (-3.37) 0.804 (-1.84) 0.450 (-6.49) 0.493 (-5.38) 0.610 (-4.92) 
Part-time worker 1.036 (0.45) 1.106 (1.13) 1.088 (1.21) 1.049 (1.53) 1.017 (0.49) 1.044 (0.96) 
Previous employment state (reference group: job-to-job change)       
Unemployment  1.747 (17.21) 1.566 (13.22) 1.330 (8.62) 2.286 (26.35) 1.826 (18.05) 1.399 (10.24) 
Non-empl. ≤ 1 year 1.959 (11.30) 1.750 (8.32) 1.557 (7.53) 2.031 (8.83) 1.764 (6.59) 1.501 (4.50) 
Non-empl. > 1 year 1.763 (10.54) 1.597 (7.87) 1.473 (7.97) 1.897 (8.29) 1.644 (6.07) 1.310 (3.41) 
Recall 1.883 (7.16) 1.621 (5.88) 1.144 (1.49) 2.162 (6.50) 1.837 (3.63) 1.596 (4.87) 
First employment 1.826 (7.13) 1.628 (5.37) 1.444 (4.26) 1.409 (3.18) 1.169 (0.91) 1.118 (1.44) 
Local labor market       
Unemployment rate 0.943 (1.51) 0.948 (-1.33) 0.985 (-0.34) 0.938 (-3.21) 0.977 (-1.04) 0.982 (-0.88) 
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Table 3 continued   
Investments in (reference groups: no investment)       
Inv. in ICT   0.909 (-2.81) 0.861 (-3.58)   0.916 (-2.81) 0.898 (-2.94) 
Inv. in further train.   0.869 (-3.57) 0.900 (-1.65)   0.895 (-3.01) 1.147 (2.78) 
Institutions (reference groups: no collective agreement, no works council)       
Collective agreement, 
industry-level  
  0.930 (-1.72) 1.087 (1.16)   0.904 (-3.20) 0.9160 (-1.70) 
Collective agreement, 
firm-level 
  1.025 (0.44) 1.282 (2.43)   0.961 (-1.08) 0.907 (-1.96) 
Wages > collective 
wage agreement 
  0.921 (-2.46) 0.888 (-2.30)   0.914 (-2.14) 0.833 (-3.06) 
Works council   0.784 (-7.31)     0.765 (-8.87)   
Year of setting up (reference group: founded 1981-1990)       
Founded ≤ 1980   1.044 (0.85)     0.849 (-1.23)   
Founded  1991-1995   0.948 (-0.90)     0.918 (-2.57)   
Founded ≥ 1996   1.101 (1.11)     0.702 (-7.41)   
Wald Chi² 1,199 3,000 663 2,722 5,457 456 
Log likelihood -1,090,882 -1,085,651 -457,174 -524,386 -520,796 -213,532 
Note: Results are shown as hazard ratios (t-values in parentheses). Dummies for nationality, occupation, industry, year, federal state ,firm size and legal form are 
included in all estimations but not reported. Results are made available by the authors on request.  
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Table 4: Interactions Between Firm and Worker Characteristics 
Effects of further training Effects of a works council  
 West Germany East Germany  West Germany East Germany 
 
hazard  
ratio 
t-Stat. 
hazard  
ratio 
t-Stat.  
hazard  
ratio 
t-Stat. 
hazard  
ratio 
t-Stat. 
Secondary school 0.938 (0.54) 1.332 (1.12) Unskilled blue collar 0.787 (5.51) 0.973 (0.62) 
A-Level 1.575 (0.68) 0.870 (3.83) Skilled blue collar 0.792 (2.96) 0.758 (4.38) 
Vocational training 0.825 (4.61) 0.468 (1.52) White collar 1.287 (1.86) 0.990 (0.08) 
Voc. Training/A-
Level 
1.250 (0.37) 0.619 (1.54) Master craftsman 0.907 (0.33) 1.201 (0.44) 
University 1.483 (0.91) 1.182 (0.65) Part-time worker 1.480 (1.02) 1.432 (4.03) 
Note: Results are shown as hazard ratios (t-values in parentheses), t-values are calculated by the delta method. 
 
Table 5: Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics 
 West Germany East Germany 
Training–education interaction 344  (4) 65 (4) 
Works council–job position interaction 407 (5) 483 (5) 
Competing risks 32,207 (78) 12,958 (73) 
Note: Degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Results from Independent Competing Risk Estimation  
 West Germany East Germany 
 Unemployment Job-to-Job Unemployment Job-to-Job 
Independent Variables hazard  ratio t-Stat. hazard  ratio t-Stat. hazard  ratio t-Stat. hazard  ratio t-Stat. 
Age in years (reference group: 25-29)     
Age 30-34 0.910 (-1.23) 0.944 (-0.93) 1.059 (0.79) 0.894 (-1.27) 
Age 35-39 0.959 (-0.53) 0.825 (-3.01) 1.149 (1.95) 0.864 (-1.68) 
Age 40-44 1.153 (1.57) 0.741 (-4.14) 1.126 (1.81) 0.826 (-2.09) 
Age 45-52 0.969 (-0.37) 0.517 (-8.53) 1.265 (3.84) 0.591 (-6.15) 
Education (reference group: vocational training)     
Secondary school 1.017 (0.23) 1.051 (0.69) 1.095 (1.65) 0.790 (-2.02) 
A-Level 1.176 (0.66) 1.843 (4.93) 0.945 (-0.23) 1.296 (0.54) 
Voc. Training/A-Level 0.796 (-1.31) 1.024 (0.26) 1.075 (0.57) 1.537 (2.16) 
University 0.663 (-3.71) 1.033 (0.41) 0.840 (-2.01) 1.331 (2.83) 
Job position (reference group: unskilled blue collar)     
Skilled blue collar 0.747 (-3.83) 0.977 (-0.33) 0.794 (-4.85) 0.874 (-1.94) 
White collar 0.564 (-5.11) 0.908 (-1.15) 0.458 (-9.35) 0.606 (-4.86) 
Master craftsman 0.502 (-3.07) 1.110 (0.61) 0.472 (-5.17) 0.610 (-2.30) 
Part-time worker 0.964 (-0.23) 1.069 (0.50) 1.037 (0.88) 0.780 (-2.66) 
Previous employment state (reference group: job-to-job change)     
Unemployment  3.097 (18.08) 0.877 (-2.41) 2.600 (18.42) 1.048 (0.78) 
Non-empl. ≤ 1 year 1.290 (1.59) 1.214 (1.87) 1.138 (0.78) 1.465 (2.76) 
Non-empl. > 1 year 0.818 (-1.56) 1.170 (1.76) 0.870 (-1.11) 1.347 (1.68) 
Recall 0.863 (-0.47) 0.608 (-2.74) 0.683 (-1.68) 0.791 (-0.72) 
First employment 0.767 (-1.08) 1.035 (0.25) 0.707 (-1.30) 0.868 (-0.46) 
Local labor market     
Unemployment rate 1.111 (1.46) 0.845 (-2.74) 0.959 (-1.45) 1.040 (0.89) 
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Table 6 continued   
Investments in (reference groups: no investment, respectively)     
Inv. in ICT 0.928 (-1.24) 0.826 (-3.75) 0.930 (-1.85) 0.885 (-2.04) 
Inv. in further training 0.857 (-2.43) 0.844 (-2.89) 0.831 (-4.04) 1.008 (0.11) 
Institutions (reference groups: no collective agreement, no works council, respectively)     
Collective agreement, 
industry-level  
0.911 (-1.24) 0.976 (-0.37) 0.993 (-0.17) 0.750 (-4.41) 
Collective agreement, firm-
level 
1.123 (1.12) 0.877 (-1.43) 1.037 (0.81) 0.798 (-2.71) 
Wages > collective wage 
agreement 
0.885 (-1.98) 0.965 (-0.73) 0.902 (-1.73) 0.950 (-0.72) 
Works council 0.825 (-3.23) 0.781 (-5.08) 0.772 (-7.11) 0.678 (-7.19) 
Year of setting up (reference group: founded 1981-1990)     
Founded ≤ 1980 1.149 (1.59) 0.885 (-1.69) 0.629 (-2.47) 1.387 (1.45) 
Founded  1991-1995 1.005 (0.05) 0.898 (-1.31) 0.912 (-2.22) 0.873 (-2.04) 
Founded ≥ 1996 0.962 (-0.26) 1.129 (0.97) 0.587 (-7.95) 0.965 (-0.43) 
Wald Chi² 2,763 1,542 5,384 1,224 
Log likelihood -383,597 -441,234 -298,510 -144,877 
Note: Results are shown as hazard ratios (t-values in parentheses). Dummies for nationality, occupation, industry, year, federal state, firm size and legal form are 
included in all estimations but not displayed. Results are made available by the authors on request.  
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 Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions of Remaining in the Job 
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(a) total sample  
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(b) by firm size  
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(c) by collective bargaining regime 
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(d) by works council dummy 
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